


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
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**DETERRENCE AND
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES**

Gary L. Guertner



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FOREWORD

The new National Military Strategy contains a number of departures from principles that have shaped the American defense posture since the Second World War. Most significant is the shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented.

This study examines these shifts and their impact on the future of deterrence. Its primary thesis is that new conditions require a dramatic shift from a nuclear to a conventional force dominant deterrent. During the cold war, conventional deterrence was severely undermined by its subordination to the bipolar strategic nuclear competition. The author argues that conditions now exist for a coherent concept of extended conventional deterrence.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this study as a contribution to the debate on National Military Strategy.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Karl W. Robinson".

Karl W. Robinson
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

GARY L. GUERTNER is the Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from the University of Arizona and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Claremont Graduate School. A former Marine Corps officer and veteran of Vietnam, Dr. Guertner has also served on the staff of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as a Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton. His latest book is *Deterrence and Defense in a Post-Nuclear World*.

DETERRENCE AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES

Introduction.

The search for national security strategy periodically opens major policy debates that push us in new, sometimes revolutionary directions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war have reopened a national debate unmatched since the end of World War II. Dramatic changes in the international system have forced us to reevaluate old strategies and look for new focal points amidst the still unsettled debris of the bipolar world. At issue is America's role in a new world order and our capabilities to defend and promote our national interests in a new environment where threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent, yet unpredictable.

The degree of uncertainty requires flexibility in our military strategy and significant departures from cold war concepts of deterrence. This study examines new options for deterrence. Its primary thesis is that new conditions in both the international and domestic environments require a dramatic shift from a nuclear to a conventional force dominant deterrent. The study identifies the theories and strategies of nuclear deterrence that transfer to modern conventional forces in a multipolar world.

One analytical obstacle to that transfer is semantic. The simultaneous rise of the cold war and the nuclear era gave rise to a body of literature and a way of thinking in which deterrence became virtually synonymous with nuclear weapons. In fact, deterrence has always been pursued through a mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The force mix changed throughout the cold war in response to new technology, anticipated threats, and fiscal constraints. There have been, for example, well-known cycles in both American and Soviet strategies when their respective strategic concepts evolved from nuclear-dominant deterrence (Eisenhower's "massive

retaliation" and its short-lived counterpart under Khrushchev), to the more balanced deterrent (Kennedy to Reagan) of flexible response which linked conventional forces to a wide array of nuclear capabilities in a "seamless web" of deterrence that was "extended" to our NATO allies.

Early proponents of nuclear weapons tended to view nuclear deterrence as a self-contained strategy, capable of deterring threats across a wide spectrum of threat. By contrast, the proponents of conventional forces have always argued that there are thresholds below which conventional forces pose a more credible deterrent. Moreover, there will always be nondeterrable threats to American interests that will require a response, and that response, if military, must be commensurate with the levels of provocation. A threat to use nuclear weapons against a Third World country, for instance, would put political objectives at risk because of worldwide reactions and the threat of horizontal escalation.

The end of the cold war has dramatically altered the "seamless web" of deterrence and decoupled nuclear and conventional forces. Nuclear weapons have a declining political-military utility once you move below the threshold of deterring a direct nuclear attack against the territory of the United States.

As a result, the post-cold war period is one in which stability and the deterrence of war are likely to be measured by the capabilities of conventional forces. Ironically, the downsizing of American and Allied forces is occurring simultaneously with shifts in the calculus of deterrence that call for conventional domination of the force mix.

Downsizing is being driven by legitimate domestic and economic issues, but it also needs strategic guidance and rationale. The political dynamics of defense cuts, whether motivated by the desire to disengage from foreign policy commitments or by the economic instincts to save the most job-producing programs in the defense budget, threaten the development of a coherent post-cold war military strategy. This study identifies strategic options for a credible deterrence against new threats to American interests. Most can be

executed by conventional forces, and present conditions make a coherent strategy of general, extended conventional deterrence feasible.

Critics of conventional deterrence argue that history has demonstrated its impotence. By contrast, nuclear deterrence of the Soviet threat arguably bought 45 years of peace in Europe. The response to this standard critique is threefold: First, conditions now exist (and were demonstrated in the Gulf War) in which the technological advantages of American conventional weapons and doctrine are so superior to the capabilities of all conceivable adversaries that their deterrence value against direct threats to U.S. interests is higher than at any period in American history.

Second, technological superiority and operational doctrine allow many capabilities previously monopolized by nuclear strategy to be readily transferred to conventional forces. For example, conventional forces now have a combination of range, accuracy, survivability and lethality to execute strategic attacks, simultaneously or sequentially, across a wide spectrum of target sets to include counterforce, command and control (including leadership), and economic.

Third, critics of conventional deterrence have traditionally set impossible standards for success. Over time, any form of deterrence may fail. We will always confront some form of nondeterrable threat. Moreover, deterrence is a renewable commodity. It wears out and must periodically be renewed. Deterrence failures provide the opportunity to demonstrate the price of aggression, rejuvenate the credibility of deterrence (collective or unilateral), and establish a new period of stability. In other words, conventional deterrence can produce long cycles of stability instead of the perennial or overlapping intervals of conflict that would be far more likely in the absence of a carefully constructed U.S. (and Allied) conventional force capability.

How we respond to deterrence failures will determine both our credibility and the scope of international stability. Figure 1 summarizes what seem to be reasonable standards for judging conventional deterrence.

Conventional Deterrence and International Stability

| Period of Stability → | Deterrence Failure → | Stability Restored OR— | Instability Spreads |
|--|----------------------|--|--|
| • Military technology advances | • Crisis or war | • Aggression is countered | • Aggression succeeds |
| • Weapons proliferate | —Collective security | • Conventional forces doctrine demonstrates capabilities | • Deterrence fails |
| • Political and economic conflicts flare | —Collective defense | • Conventional deterrence revitalized | • Utility of aggression demonstrated |
| • Incentives for war increase | —Unilateral action | • New period of stability begins | • Period of instability extended in scope and duration |
| • Risk of miscalculation increases | | • U.S. interests protected | • U.S. interests at risk |
| • Deterrence fails | | | |

Figure 1.

Long periods of stability may or may not be attributable to the success of deterrence. In any case, no deterrence system or force mix can guarantee an "end to history." Paradoxically, stability is dynamic in the sense that forces are constantly at work to undermine the status quo. Those forces, also summarized in Figure 1, mean that deterrence failures are, over time, inevitable. Readers may have difficulty associating column 1 (Figure 1) with periods of "stability." Regrettably, in international politics that's as good as it gets.

The United States should, therefore, base its military strategy on weapons that can be used without the threat of self-deterrence or of breaking up coalition forces needed for their political legitimacy and military capability. If we are serious about deterring regional threats on a global scale, this strategic logic will push us into a post-cold war deterrence regime dominated by conventional forces.

A Conventional Force Dominant Deterrent.

Conventional deterrence has a future, but one very different from its past in which it was subordinated to nuclear threats and derived from classic strategic nuclear theory. The United

States now faces a multipolar international political system that may be destabilized by a proliferation of armed conflict and advanced weaponry. To secure stability, security and influence in this new world order, the United States can use the military prowess it demonstrated in the Gulf War to good advantage. However, using that force effectively, or threatening to use it, requires the formulation of a coherent strategy of "general extended conventional deterrence" and the prudent planning of general purpose forces that are credible and capable of underwriting a new military strategy.

Neither proponents nor critics should judge this analysis in isolation. Conventional deterrence cannot succeed unless it is reinforced by supporting policies and concepts. The strategic concepts in the current National Military Strategy document which appear to have the greatest synergistic value in support of conventional deterrence are:¹

- Technological superiority,
- Collective security,
- Strategic agility, and
- Theater defenses.

Technological Superiority. Expected reductions in the overall force structure will make the force-multiplying effects of technological superiority more important than ever. Space-based sensors, defense-suppression systems, "brilliant weapons," and stealth technologies give true meaning to the concept of force multipliers. This broad mix of technologies can make conventional forces decisive provided that they are planned and integrated into an effective doctrine and concept of operations. The most likely conflicts involving the United States will be against less capable states that have trouble employing their forces and their technology in effective combined arms operations. As Tony Cordesman has concluded in his assessment of the Gulf War,

...the U.S. can cut its force structure and still maintain a decisive military edge over most threats in the Third World. It can exploit the heritage of four decades of arming to fight a far more sophisticated and combat ready enemy so that it can fight under conditions where

it is outnumbered or suffers from significant operational disadvantages.²

Exploiting technology to get economies of force will require investments where the pay-off in battlefield lethality is greatest. Given the threats that our forces are most likely to confront in regional contingencies, these technologies will include:

- Battle management resources for real-time integration of sensors-command-control and weapons systems that make enemy forces transparent and easily targeted;
- Mobility of conventional forces to fully exploit technological superiority and battlefield transparency;
- Smart conventional weapons with range and lethality; and.
- Component upgrades for existing delivery platforms to avoid costly generational replacements. This means limited procurement of new tactical fighters, tanks, bombers, submarines, or other platforms that were originally conceived to counter a modernized Soviet threat.

Technology that leads to unaffordable procurement threatens us with force multipliers of .9 or less. Net decreases in combat-capable forces can best be avoided through combinations of selective upgrading and selective low-rate procurement.

Technological superiority will also depend on concurrent political strategies. Technology is a double-edged sword; it can act as a force multiplier, but the laws of science apply equally to our potential adversaries. Multilateral support for the nonproliferation of both nuclear and critical conventional military technologies can be an equally effective means for preempting threats to our interests and for underwriting conventional deterrence.

Collective Security. Collective security has become explicitly incorporated in the National Military Strategy. It is broadly defined to include both collective security

(UN-sanctioned activities) and collective defense (formal alliances such as NATO) arrangements. These are linked informally in what could, if promoted by the United States, form transregional security linkages—a "seamless web" of collective action.³

The potential value of collective security to conventional deterrence is difficult to quantify because it requires the United States to link its security to the capabilities and political will of others. Its potential must always be balanced against the risk that collective action may require significant limitations on unilateral action. Nevertheless, there are three compelling reasons for the United States to embrace collective security:

- First, allies or coalition partners are essential for basing or staging the range of capabilities required to fully exploit technologically superior forces against a regional hegemon.
- Second, the American public shows little enthusiasm for an active role as the single, global superpower. Collective deterrence is politically essential for sharing not only the military burden, but also the increasingly salient political and fiscal responsibilities.
- Third, patterns of collective action, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, give conventional deterrence credibility and capabilities that the United States can no longer afford or achieve on its own. Even though collective action and shared capabilities may limit our freedom of action, these limits are reassuring to others and may contribute more to stability than attempts by the world's only superpower to unilaterally impose deterrence—nuclear or conventional.

Strategic Agility. Strategic agility is a generic concept that reflects the dramatic changes in cold war forward deployment patterns that fixed U.S. forces on the most threatened frontiers in Germany and Korea. Old planning assumptions have given way to new requirements to meet diffuse regional contingencies. Simply stated, American forces will be assembled by their rapid movement from wherever they are to wherever they are needed. Strategic agility requires mobile

forces and adaptive planning for a diverse range of options. Many of these options signal our commitment and demonstrate military capabilities short of war. Joint exercises, UN peacekeeping missions, and even humanitarian/disaster relief operations provide opportunities to display power projection capabilities and global reach despite reduced forward deployment of forces.

Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses. Nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation make theater air and antitactical ballistic missile defenses important components of conventional deterrence. The next states that are likely to acquire nuclear arms are under radical regimes that are openly hostile to U.S. interests (North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, if UN intervention fails).⁴ The success of such regional powers in creating even a small nuclear umbrella under which they could commit aggression would represent a serious challenge to U.S. global strategy.

Theater defenses in support of conventional deterrence need not be a part of the grander objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative or its most recent variant, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The layered, space-based weapons architecture of these costly systems seem, at best, technologically remote and, at worst, vestiges of the cold war.⁵ What is needed in the near term is a global, space-based early warning, command and control network that is linked to modernized, mobile, land-based theater defense systems (Patriot follow-on or Theater High-Altitude Area Defense [THAAD] interceptors designed for greater defense of countervalue targets).

Theater Strategic Targeting With Conventional Forces.

Uncertainties about nondeterrable nuclear threats make it all the more imperative that the United States also have credible warfighting options. Nuclear preemption prior to an attack is not plausible, and there are uncertainties as to whether any President or his coalition partners would authorize a response in kind, even after nuclear first-use by the enemy. More plausible are the range of conventional options afforded

by modern, high-tech weapons that have a theater strategic capability for both denial and punishment missions. The broad outline of a conventional deterrence strategy would include:

- Conventional preemption of the nuclear/chemical infrastructure and key command and control nodes to deny or disrupt an attack (deterrence by denial).
- Threats of conventional escalation to countervalue targets if nuclear weapons are used (deterrence by punishment).
- Threats to seize enemy territory (deterrence by punishment).
- Countervalue retaliation by conventional forces if deterrence and preemption fail (deterrence by punishment).
- Theater antitactical missile and air defenses (deterrence by denial).

The air war against Iraq demonstrated the limitations of counterforce targeting against missiles and nuclear/chemical infrastructures. The imperfect capability of deterrence by denial (even with nuclear weapons) and the unknowable responses to threats of retaliation and punishment leave theater antitactical ballistic missile defenses as the last line of defense for U.S. and coalition forces. On balance, conventional deterrence that combines attempts to dissuade, capabilities to neutralize or capture, credible threats to retaliate, and the ability to defend is more credible than nuclear threats against regional powers. Together, these capabilities dramatically reduce the coercive potential of Third World nuclear programs. This does not mean, however, that nuclear forces have no role to play in the future of deterrence.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Conventional Force-Dominant Deterrent.

The National Military Strategy 1992 states that the purpose of nuclear forces is "to deter the use of weapons of mass

destruction and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat."⁶

The dilemma confronting the United States is still the same classic problem that confronted strategists throughout the cold war. Nuclear weapons fulfill their declared deterrence function only if they are never used. Yet, if everyone knows that they will never be used, they lack the credibility to deter. The most credible means to resolve this dilemma is through a combination of declaratory policies and military capability that emphasizes the warfighting capabilities of conventional forces with strategic reach.⁷

There is, however, a potential paradox of success if aggressive Third World leaders believe that only weapons of mass destruction can offset U.S. advantages in conventional military power. Under such circumstances, theater nuclear weapons can have important signaling functions that communicate new risks and introduce greater costs for nuclear aggression that inflicts high casualties on U.S. forces or on allied countervalue targets.

Nuclear signaling can take the form of presidential or DOD declarations that U.S. ships deploying to a hostile theater of operations have been refitted with nuclear weapons carried by dual-capable aircraft (DCA) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM).⁸ Deployment options alone can play a critical role in the strategic calculus of aggressors who possess uncommitted nuclear capabilities.

The role of strategic nuclear forces is also directly related to the problems of reorienting the National Military Strategy from a global to a regional focus. The first problem is determining the force structure after the combined reductions of the START Treaty, unilateral initiatives, and reciprocal arrangements with the Russian Republic. The results will be dramatic cuts in U.S. strategic forces from some 12,000 strategic warheads to approximately 4,000 or less.⁹ These cuts are prudent responses to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and give us a long-sought opportunity to pull back from the nuclear brink where we so often found ourselves during the cold war. Moreover, these reductions fulfill our obligations

under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). They should be accompanied by strong U.S. endorsements of the treaty and support for the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime as we move toward a critical NPT review conference in 1995.

The credibility of U.S. support for nonproliferation will also be affected by the declaratory policies and targeting strategy for a smaller strategic nuclear force structure. The most comprehensive review of the problem to date suggests that we could be moving in the right direction provided that the strategic role of conventional forces dominates future planning. A report by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Advisory Group, chaired by former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas C. Reed, recommends major changes in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

The cold war SIOP contained carefully calibrated strike options against the former Soviet Union. In its place, the panel recommends an Integrated Strike Employment Plan (ISEP) with a "near real time" flexibility to cover a wider range of targets with a smaller force structure. The proposal identifies five categories of plans:¹⁰

- *Plan Alpha* is a conventional force option against selective strategic targets of "every reasonable adversary."
- *Plan Echo* is a nuclear option for theater contingencies or "Nuclear Expeditionary Forces."
- *Plan Lima* is a set of limited SIOP-like nuclear options against Russian force projection assets.
- *Plan Mike* is a more robust version of *Plan Lima* with graduated attack options in the 10s, 100s, and 1000s.
- *Plan Romeo* is a strategic nuclear reserve force (SRF) to deter escalation, support war termination, and preclude other nuclear powers not directly involved in an ongoing crisis from coercing the United States.

In their current form, these recommendations are excessive and favor a nuclear force structure that is not well suited for credible deterrence in the new world order. If they were

misinterpreted as official policy, the United States could be accused of a double standard in declaring the value of nuclear weapons at the same time that it was asking others to foreswear them.

In the case of the former Soviet Union, U.S. targeting policy should be muted. Prudence dictates that advantage be taken of every opportunity for mutual reductions of force levels and confidence-building measures such as lower alert rates, improved command and control structures, and cooperative steps to improve the safety of nuclear storage, transportation, and destruction procedures.¹¹

Russia will remain a nuclear power with a potential to threaten the United States and its allies. On the other hand, it is no longer the center of a hostile global movement or the leader of a powerful military alliance threatening Europe with overwhelming force deep in its own territory. Russian behavior is leveraged more by its need for Western aid and technology than by U.S. military capabilities. It is difficult to conceive credible scenarios in which even the most reactionary great Russian nationalist could find in nuclear weapons the tools that could be used against the West in preplanned ways to coerce concessions or that might tempt revisionist leaders to adopt reckless and inflexible positions. The United States will and should, along with its British and French allies, retain nuclear options, but it is premature in the extreme to plan robust nuclear attacks against the "force projection assets" of a state that is struggling for democracy and economic reforms.¹²

Even though the United States may be a benevolent superpower, the political impact of global nuclear targeting is more likely to stimulate rather than deter nuclear proliferation. An alternative set of declaratory policies that are consistent with nonproliferation include commitments to deep cuts in nuclear forces coupled with a *defensive* strategy of direct retaliation against nuclear attacks on U.S. territory. Direct retaliation is one of the few credible missions for strategic nuclear forces in the post-cold war world. Extending deterrence should be a function of conventional forces (the option embodied in Plan Alpha above).

Global retargeting by nuclear forces is an unfortunate concept that is more likely to put American interests at risk in the long run. Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, struck a more positive image in his correct observation that retargeting frightens people. It is better, he said, to discuss "nontargeting," which lowers the level of alert to "zero flight assignments of missiles."¹³

The Marshal's formulations are too vague to serve as the basis of national policy. Nevertheless, his point should not be dismissed. The objectives of national military strategy are more likely to be achieved through the *implicit* flexibility to respond to nuclear aggression from any source rather than *explicit* declarations of global nuclear targeting. Many regional crises may be precipitated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. U.S. strategy will, therefore, require a delicate balance not to give incentives to that very threat. A reassuring posture, in the eyes of regional actors and global partners, will require reexamination and "denuclearization" of deterrence in a new multipolar world.

Finally, and above all, this study's primary purpose has been to recommend the option of using modern conventional forces for strategic purposes. A reliance on offensive nuclear weapons carries enormous risks that brought us to the brink of war during several cold war crises. The American public has every right to expect that the cold war's principal legacy of danger not be deliberately extended into the new world order.

ENDNOTES

1. These strategic concepts are drawn from *The National Military Strategy 1992*, released by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1992. Some have been narrowed in scope for ease of analysis. For example, the NMS lists strategic deterrence and defense as one of the four foundations on which our strategy is built. This study narrows this strategic concept to conventional deterrence and theater defense.

2. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Compensating For Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means Through Technology." Paper presented at the Third Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, February 14, 1992, p. 2.

3. For a detailed assessment of collective security and U.S. strategy, see Inis Claude, Jr., Sheldon Simon, and Douglas Stuart, *Collective Security in Asia and Europe*, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2, 1992. Ironically, the administration's pledge to support growing UN peacekeeping activities is under attack by members of Congress because of a long-standing agreement that makes the United States responsible for 30 percent of the cost of every operation. Japan and Western Europeans could conceivably relieve part of the perceived inequity, but Congress should also examine these costs in the larger context of collective security and global stability. See Don Oberdorfer, "Lawmakers Balk at Peacekeeping's Cost," *The Washington Post*, March 4, 1992, p. A17.

4. Leonard S. Spector, "Deterring Regional Threats From Nuclear Proliferation." Paper presented at the Third Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 14, 1992, p. 31 and Appendix A.

5. In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on December 10, 1991, CIA Director Robert Gates stated that only Russian and Chinese missiles could threaten the territory of the United States. He did not expect direct risks from other countries for at least another decade. See *Statement of The Director of Central Intelligence*, pp. 16-17.

6. *The National Military Strategy 1992*, p. 13.

7. A major thesis of this study is that conventional deterrence must occasionally give way to conflicts that demonstrate capabilities, thereby strengthening deterrence for a new phase of stability. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had much the same effect on nuclear deterrence.

8. President Bush's unilateral initiatives in September 1991 eliminated ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons and withdrew them from surface ships and submarines. Some sea-based weapons are scheduled for destruction. Others are in storage from where they can be redeployed for the "signaling" purposes advocated here.

9. President Bush's January 1992 initiative pledged cuts in strategic nuclear warheads up to 50 percent below START-permitted ceilings of approximately 8,000 warheads.

10. Thomas C. Reed and Michael O. Wheeler, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order," JSTPS/SAG Deterrence Study Group, October 19, 1991, pp. 33-34. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Urged to Cut 50% of A-Arms," *The Washington Post*, January 6, 1992, p. A1.

11. These latter steps are well underway. Congress allocated \$400 million to assist Russian efforts to transport, store, and destroy nuclear

weapons, and on March 26, 1992, the State Department announced the appointment of Retired Major General William F. Burns, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to head the U.S. delegation on Safety, Security, and Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons (SSD Talks). Moscow has agreed on U.S. assistance in the production of containers for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons, conversion of rail cars for secure transport, construction of storage facilities, training in nuclear accident response, accounting procedures, and ultimate disposition of enriched uranium and plutonium. See Department of State Press Release, March 26, 1992.

12. Open discussions of nuclear targeting in the press were followed by equally controversial reporting of threat scenarios that were developed in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These scenarios included a hypothetical NATO counterattack if Russia invaded Lithuania. There is virtually no support in NATO or in the U.S. Congress for such a course of action. However, the scenario does raise the question of what the United States should do in the event of a Russian-initiated civil war to reunite the former Soviet Union. Russian nationalists could indeed threaten nuclear retaliation against Western intervention. History suggests, however, that Western response would be political and economic, but not military, thus making nuclear threats irrelevant. "Threat" scenarios are discussed by Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenario Spotlights Russia," *The Washington Post*, February 20, 1992, p. A1.

13. Marshal Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, interview in *Red Star*, February 22, 1992, pp. 1-3. Quoted in *FBIS-SOV-92-036*, February 24, 1992, p. 8.

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